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Ensuring the confidentiality of any data exchanged always presents a great concern for all
communication instances. Technically, encryption is the ideal solution for this task. However,
this process must deal with the progress of the cryptanalysis that aims to disclose the information
exchanged. The risk increases due to the need for a dual transmission that includes the encrypted
medium and the decryption key. In a context of chaotic encryption of images, we propose to
insert the decryption key into the encrypted image using image watermarking. Thus, only the
watermarked encrypted image will be transmitted. Upon reception, the recipient extracts the key
and decrypts the image. The cryptosystem proposed is based on an encryption using a dynamic
Look-Up Table issued from a chaotic generator. The obtained results prove the efficiency of our
method to ensure a secure exchange of images and keys.
Keywords: image encryption, image watermarking, crypto-watermarking, cryptanalysis, chaos.
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1 Introduction
Recent research presents various information-processing techniques to ensure the confidentiality of
data exchange. These concerns also affect the exchange of images. In this context, encryption is the
solution most solicited for this kind of application. Several algorithms have been used, including the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [32], Data Encryption Standard (DES) [13], chaotic encryption
[5, 7], and quantum encryption [1]. These different methods differ in terms of the relationship between
the encryption and decryption keys, the complexity, and the size of the information to be encrypted.
Yet, they all require a total or partial transmission of the decryption key. This key is typically used in
any encrypted communication between the two communicating entities. Thus, besides the encrypted
information, the communication must include the key which is the necessary component for decryption.
The sending of this key which is presented in the form of a small data frame can arouse the suspicions
of its possible interception, and the consequent breaking of the cryptosystem.
Other techniques are proposed to ensure the confidentiality of the communication by hiding the in-
formation to be transmitted in another host medium referring to the watermarking and the steganog-
raphy. The watermarking consists in inserting the information to be hidden in an image without
introducing a great distortion to the host document [2]. This limitation reduces the insertion capacity,
which makes it unsuitable for hosting a large image. On the other hand, steganography [14, 20, 29, 31]
allows the mixing of two or more images leaving the cover image visible while allowing to hide the
other images [10]. Unfortunately, this mixing can cause visible distortion on the cover image and the
embedded images during their extraction, which is not suitable for certain applications such as in the
medical or industrial domains.
In this paper, we propose a security approach that combines encryption and watermarking. This
combination was mentioned previously by W. Puech and J.M. Rodrigues in [34] and it was based
on the RSA encryption and watermarking in the image frequency representation. In this work, we
have opted for chaotic encryption and an image watermarking in the space domain. In addition,
we deepened our cryptanalysis study and studied the impact of watermarking on the security of the
image to be transmitted. Indeed, the image is encrypted by a chaotic cryptosystem whose key is hidden
using the watermarking in the same encrypted medium. Thus, a single file will be transmitted to the
receiver and it will be easily deciphered. On the other hand, the ignorance of the decryption key or the
watermarked components of the image leads to the failure of decryption. Moreover, this new condition
will constitute another obstacle for any attempt at cryptanalysis and allows the communicating entities
to regularly and easily change the parameters of their cryptosystem. To explain our approach, we
present the principle of image watermarking in the first section. Next, we present the principle of image
encryption. In Section 4, we detail our approach of image watermarked encryption. The obtained
results are illustrated and discussed in Section 5. Finally, we end the paper with our conclusions and
perspectives.
2 Image watermarking
Image watermarking consists in the insertion of a digital sequence (real or binary), called signature,
in an image. This insertion can be done in one of the different representations of the image such the
spatial [8], frequency [28], and multiresolution [22] domains. It is carried out in the association
of selected components of the image with the elements of the signature using one of the following
Equations (1-4) [19].
yi = xi + αwi (1)
yi = xi (1 + α)wi (2)








where xi, yi, wi, i, α are the image components selected to carry the mark, the watermarked
components of the resulting image, the signature element, the index of the image element to watermark,
and the visibility coefficient of the signature to insert, respectively.
The second phase is to extract the inserted signature or to detect its presence by exploiting the
watermarked image for blind watermarking, the signature supposed to have been inserted in the case
of the semi-blind and the original image for the non-blind watermarking.
The insertion of the signature must be imperceptible and robust by allowing its extraction or
detection as long as the image is exploitable. Thus, the assessment of watermarking essentially affects
the distortion of the watermarked image which can be quantified by the Peak Signal Noise Ratio
(PSNR) [21] derived from the Mean Square Error (MSE) or the Structural Similarity Index Metric
(SSIM) [24] and the signature distortion by comparing the extracted signature with the inserted
signature. This can be quantified in terms of correlation and by the Bit Error Rate (BER).
Image watermarking has emerged as a copyright protection [23] tool by inserting the work owner
signature to conquer new areas such as fingerprinting [25] disclosing illegal copies, integrity checking
and indexing [27] of images by inserting into the host medium its summary, medical ethics by inserting
the patient record in its medical image [33], and image compression based on image resizing by
embedding an enlargement technique code in each block of the reduced image [9].
3 Image encryption
In the digital world of today, the security of transmitted digital images/videos becomes more and
more vital, against increasingly vicious web attacks. Cryptography is used to ensure security in open
networks because of its being the science that uses mathematics to offer encryption algorithms to
protect information. Researchers have focused on the image encryption in an attempt to cope with
the recent fast exchange and transmission of digital images over the internet [39].
3.1 Encryption techniques
Many cryptographic methods have been proposed. These techniques are classified into three main
categories. First, symmetric cryptography uses the same key for encryption and decryption. Data
Encryption Standard (DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and chaotic encryption [3, 4, 30,
38] are the best known examples of symmetric encryption. Second, asymmetric cryptography uses two
different keys. The earliest realization of a public key algorithm, called RSA [35] following the names of
its inventors Rivest, Shamir and Adelman, is the most used algorithm in asymmetric encryption. The
third category of methods is the hybrid cryptography which combines the best features of symmetric
and asymmetric cryptographic methods [17].
3.2 Cryptanalysis
While cryptography is the discipline that ensures the security of confidential information, crypt-
analysis is the discipline that studies and validates the robustness of cryptosystems against attacks
[38]. According to Kerckhoffs, the security of a cryptosystem depends on the secrecy of the key and not
on that of the encryption algorithm. To study the cryptosystem security, we can utilize the Kerckhoffs
principle. In this case, the cryptanalyst must be unable to find the key even if s/he has access to the
plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext. S/He tries to apply more attacks such as ciphertext-only,
chosen plaintext, known plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks.
3.3 Assessment metrics
The large size, the high redundancy and the correlation that exist between the neighboring pixels
of an image are interesting properties that differentiate the image information from that of the visual
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and textual information. These properties are at the origin of some evaluation criteria defined by
key space analysis, key sensitivity, differential and statistical attacks. A good cryptosystem must be
immune to all types of attack.
In fact, to have a secure encryption system, the key space must be expanded to withstand the
Brute-Force Attack. Therefore, it is recommended to encode the decryption key on at least 512 bits
[6]. Moreover, a small modification on the decryption key must not provide any information about the
original image [6]. On the other hand, differential analysis quantifies the effect of a slight variation of
the clear message on the encrypted message [12]. In fact, a single pixel modification yields an NPCR
(Number of Pixels Change Rate) of more than 99% and a UACI (Unified Average Changing Intensity)
close 33% when comparing the encrypted original and the encrypted modified images [18, 36, 40].
Lastly, statistical analysis highlights the image encryption impact. An encrypted image must be
totally different from the original image and without any static resemblance in terms of histograms
and neighbor pixels correlation. Thus, the entropy of a grayscale encrypted image must be very close
to 8 bits/pixel [37] and the adjacent pixels correlation must be almost zero [11].
4 Proposed approach
The purpose of this work is to insert the decryption key into the encrypted image. Therefore, only
one file is sent to the recipient. From this file, the recipient retrieves the decryption key inserted in
the image and uses it to decrypt the received image. This requires a combination of watermarking
and encryption. This technique is called watermarked encryption, and its principle is detailed in this
section.
4.1 Principal
During this exchange of images, only 2 entities intervene: the sender and the recipient. Each of
these two entities has an identifier necessary for the encryption/decryption of the exchanged image. To
further complicate the task of the hackers, a third key of decryption will be added in our cryptosystem.
To transmit this last decryption key, the sender inserts it into the encrypted image using Least
Significant Bit (LSB) watermarking.
As shown in Figure 1, the encryption of the image begins with a chaotic rearrangement of the
image pixels (CRP1) parameterized by the identifier of the recipient (Subkey: Key1). The ordered
pixels (CiphIm1) will be split into 2 sub-groups: GRP1 and GRP2. The 7 most significant bits of
GRP1 will be encrypted by a chaotic cryptosystem (CRP3) based on the dynamic Look-Up Table
(7-bit Ch. Dyn. LUT) parameterized by a subkey (Key3) chosen by the sender. We continue in the
same encryption procedure to encrypt GRP2 by spreading out the chaotic dynamic LUT to cipher
8 bits (CRP4: Ch. Dyn 8-bit LUT). The Key3 subkey that can change value must keep the same
structure for any encrypted image exchange. The number of pixels of GRP1 will be equal to the
number of bits of Key3. The concatenation of ciphered GRP1 and ciphered GRP2 will then form the
encrypted image CiphIm2. The sender must cipher the Key3 subkey by a chaotic cryptosystem based
on the 8-bit dynamic LUT (CRP2: 8-bit Ch. Dyn. LUT) parameterized by its identifier (Key2).
After its encryption, the subkey Key3 will be inserted into the least significant bits of the first pixels
of CyphIm2, which corresponds to the LSB of the ciphered GRP1. The image resulting from this
watermarking will be named CiphIm2W . The last step of our cryptosystem consists in restoring the
initial order of pixels by the decryption of CiphIm2W by the cryptosystem CRP1. Thus, we get our
final encrypted image CyphIm.
Thus, upon reception, the recipient begins by encrypting the received image (CiphIm) by CRP1.
Then, the ciphered subkey CiphKey3 is extracted and deciphered by CRP2 to recoverKey3. The pixels
of the resulting image will be split into two subgroups to recover the ciphered GRP1 (CiphGRP1) and
the ciphered GRP2 (CiphGRP2). After that, the 7 most significant bits of CiphGRP1 are deciphered
by CRP3 to have GRP1 and the pixels of CiphGRP2 using CRP4 to recover CRP2. The concatenation
of GRP1 and GRP2 gives CiphIm1. Finally, the pixels of this image will be repositioned at their initial























Figure 1: Principle of the proposed approach
4.2 Logistic Map function for chaotic encryption
A chaotic system is very sensitive to its initial value and its parameters [5]. Such a system presents
a random and deterministic aspect [7]. Therefore, it is widely used in cryptography and particularly
for image encryption [16, 26]. In this context, the Logistic Map (LM) function is one of the most used
kernels to generate a chaotic signal. The expression of this function is as follows [11, 15]:
Xn+1 = µ× (1−Xn) (5)
With: Xn belongs to [0, 1] whatever is n, and µ is a control parameter where 0 < µ ≤ 4.
Yet, to ensure a perfectly chaotic behavior, we must have µ between 3.9 and 4 and the generated
chaotic values are included in the interval [0, 1]. The LM function will be the kernel of our chaotic
sequence generator while imposing some conditions such as the exclusion of values outside an interval
[Vmin, Vmax]and the first N values generated. The figure below depicts the principle of our generator:
µ Xn (1-Xn)
If  (n> N) and Xn ϵ [Vmin,Vmax] 
Ch(j)=Xn; j=j+1
end
X0 µ N [Vmin,Vmax]
Ch(j)
Figure 2: Principle of our chaotic sequence generator
We note that our chaotic generator is parameterized by 5 parameters, namely X0 (initial condition
of the LM function), µ, N , Vmin and Vmax. These consist of three reals (X0, Vmin, Vmax) included in
]0, 1[, one real (µ) included in ]3.9, 4[, and a positive integer (N).
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4.3 Chaotic encryption by pixel reordering
The encryption of the image starts with a pixels reordering (CRP1) in order to introduce a discon-
tinuity on the image’s profiles. This will make it difficult to break the sub cryptosystems to be used
in the following steps. To do this, we will use a chaotic generator based on the chaotic logistic map
function parameterized by the identifier of the recipient. Thus, we generate a real chaotic sequence
that will be used to reorder the appearance of the pixels. This same chaotic generator will be used at
the end of our encryption procedure to reposition the pixels ciphered by CRP2, CRP3 and CRP4 to
their initial position.
4.4 Chaotic encryption based on Dynamic Look-Up Table
The generation of a chaotic LUT is a reordering of the gray levels values the pixel can have to cipher
it. Indeed, a chaotic LUT generated for a pixel of value P coded on Nb bits consists in reordering
the natural integer values ranging from 0 to 2Nb − 1 and to consider the P th value as the encrypted
value of P . To create this LUT (Figure 3), we use our chaotic generator parameterized by an initial




(the last chaotic value from the chaotic sequence used to
create the chaotic LUT of the previous pixel) and the normalized value of the original pixel (P/2Nb),
the number of iterations to be ignored is none other than the encrypted value of the last pixel Pc. The
parameters µ, Vmin and Vmax are extracted from Key2 for the encryption of Key3 and from Key3 for
the encryption of GRP1 and GRP2.
Ch(0) Ch(1) Ch(2) … Ch(2Nb-2) Ch(2Nb-1)
LUT(0) LUT(1) LUT(2) … LUT(2Nb-2) LUT(2Nb-1)
Chaotic 
generator
X0 µ N Vmin Vmax
P
Pc
Figure 3: Principle of chaotic dynamic Look-Up Table
To compute the encrypted value of the first original pixel, the number of ignored iterations N is
provided from the cryptosystem’s key (Key2 for CRP2, Key3 for CRP3) while the previous original
pixel is considered zero. It is worth noting here that the result of CRP3. is utilized to cipher GRP2
by CRP4.
5 Results and discussion
To assess our proposed cryptosystem, we encrypted and decrypted an image database including
50 grayscale images having 256×256 size using MATLAB 7.6. This mathematical tool codes a real in 8
bytes. Consequently, each one ofKey1 ({X1, µ1, N1, Vmin 1, Vmax 1}),Key2 ({X2, µ2, N2, Vmin 2, Vmax 2}),
and Key3 ({X3, µ3, N3, Vmin 3, Vmax 3}) is coded on 40 bytes which provides us a global key
(Key = {Key1,Key2,Key3}) coded on 120 bytes, which means 2960 combinations of the secret key
and space key width equal to 960 bits. However, during an information exchange, Key1 and Key2 are
fixed by the sender and the recipient, thereby reducing the number of secret key combinations to 2320
for a single image exchange.
In fact, Key3 is inserted into the encrypted image. This watermarking could introduce a slight
dissemblance between the original image and the decrypted one. In Figure 4, we illustrate an original
image (Figure 4a) and its encrypted (Figure 4b) as well as decrypted counterparts (Figure 4c).
According to Figure 4a and Figure 4c, there is no visual difference between the original image and
the decrypted one. Nonetheless, there is a slight difference with a PSNR equal to 74.77dB. This PSNR
which is higher than 60dB reflects an imperceptible image distortion. By applying our cryptosystem
on the images test bank, we obtain an average PSNR of 74.32dB, which means very high resemblance
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: Example of encrypted/decrypted image using our proposed cryptosystem: (a) Original
image, (b) Encrypted image, (c) Decrypted image
between the original images and their decrypted counterparts. Thus, we conclude that the distortion
introduced by the watermarking is invisible.
Moving to the statistical analysis, we could visually confirm the great difference between the
original image (Figure 4a) and the encrypted image (Figure 4b). Moreover, the histograms of these
images (Figures 5a-5b) are very different.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Histogram analysis: (a) Histogram of the original image, (b) Histogram of the encrypted
image
The second analysis consists on the study of the correlation between adjacent pixels. This study
concerns adjacent pixels horizontally, vertically or diagonally from original and encrypted images.
Generally, adjacent pixels of original image are highly correlated as shown in Figures 6a-6c while two
adjacent pixels of encrypted should be very different. Figures 7a-7c prove that the adjacent pixels of
most pixels of test encrypted image are different from the horizontal, vertical and diagonal neighbors.
According to Figure 5b, we note that the encrypted image has an almost uniform histogram. This
result is confirmed analytically by an average entropy of the encrypted images equal to 7.9806 bit/pixel
which is very close to an 8 bits/pixel code and conform to the image encryption standards.
The second analysis consists in the study of the correlation between adjacent pixels. This study
concerns adjacent pixels horizontally, vertically and diagonally from original and encrypted images.
Generally, adjacent pixels of the original image are highly correlated as shown in Figure 6, while
two adjacent pixels of the encrypted image should be very different. Figure 7proves that the adjacent
pixels of most of the test encrypted image pixels are different from the horizontal, vertical and diagonal
neighbors.
In Table 1, we summarize the adjacent pixel correlations of the 50 images of our image test bank
before and after their encryptions. These results confirm the continuous aspect of original images
expressed by a high correlation rate exceeding 0.9. On the other hand, the correlation rates between
the adjacent pixels of the encrypted images are almost null, reflecting a strong introduction of the
randomness in these images.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6: Correlation of adjacent pixels of the original image: (a) Horizontal neighbor pixel correlation,
(b) Vertical neighbor pixel correlation, (c) Diagonal neighbor pixel correlation
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7: Correlation of adjacent pixels of the encrypted image: (a) Horizontal neighbor pixel corre-
lation, (b) Vertical neighbor pixel correlation, (c) Diagonal neighbor pixel correlation
Table 1: Average correlation of adjacent pixels of the original and the encrypted images
Adjacent pixels Adjacent pixels Adjacent pixels
horizontally vertically diagonally
Original images 0.9330 0.9691 0.9481
Encrypted images 0.0093 -0.0110 -0.0018
Moving to the study of the encryption/decryption keys sensitivity, as the encryption/decryption
key is compounded by 3 subkeys, namely Key1, Key2 and Key3, we suggest using three new keys K1,
K2, and K3 where we introduce a slight variation (10−15) on X1 (from Key1), X2 (from Key2) and
X3 (from Key3) of our initial key Key, respectively.
Firstly, we decipher encrypted images (encrypted using our initial key Key) K1, K2, and K3,
respectively. In Figure 8, we illustrate the results obtained for the decryption of our image test
(Figure 4b).
This failure is observed every time an encrypted image is decrypted by means of a wrong key.
In Table 2, we report the results of the comparison between the original image and its decrypted
counterparts using K1, K2, and K3 in terms of average NPCR, average UACI, and average PSNR.
Table 2: Sensitivity assessment of the decryption key
Decryption Decryption Decryption Decryption
using K1 using K2 using K3 using Key
Average NPCR (%) 99.5950 99.5868 99.5888 0.2426
Average UACI (%) 31.5339 31.5308 31.5189 0.0010
Average PSNR (dB) 8.5044 8.5041 8.5095 74.3220
By introducing a tiny modification (10−15) in the decryption key, the decryption process yields a
blatant failure expressed by a high NPCR exceeding 99%, a UACI higher than 31%, and a weak PSNR
well below 30dB. On the other hand, the decrypted image using the true key Key shows a small and
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 8: Failed decryption using unsuitable key: (a) Failed decryption usingK1, (b) Failed decryption
using K2, (c) Failed decryption using K3
invisible distortion. This slight dissemblance is due to the use of the watermarking to insert Key3.
Secondly, we focus on the influence of the key variation on the encryption process. To do so, we
compare the encrypted images by Key to those encrypted by K1, K2, and K3, respectively. Visually,
the obtained images seem similar due to the randomness introduced in the images while encrypting
them. Therefore, we use assessment metrics to quantify the difference between these images. Table 3
includes the outcome of this comparative study of the encrypted images by Key to their counterparts
encrypted by K1, K2, and K3, respectively.
Table 3: Sensitivity assessment of the encryption key
Encryption Encryption Encryption
using K1 using K2 using K3
Average NPCR (%) 99.5845 99.5773 99.5895
Average UACI (%) 31.0517 31.0265 31.0165
Average PSNR (dB) 8.6262 8.6342 8.6358
Based on the high NPCR exceeding 99%, the high UACI of more than 31%, and the weak PSNR
(much less than 30dB), we could confirm the great sensitivity of our proposed cryptosystem to the
encryption key variation.
Indeed, the chaotic behavior and the great dependence of the chaotic generator on its parameters
{X0, µ,N, Vmin, Vmax} explain the high sensitivity of our cryptosystem to any change in the encryp-
tion/decryption key.
We continue our evaluation by undertaking a differential analysis where we study the effect of the
change of a pixel on the encryption and decryption processes. The encryption differential analysis
consists in the encryption of two very similar original images. In fact, the second image is none other
than the first one where we modified only one pixel. Then, we proceed to comparing the encrypted
image to the modified encrypted one obtained using the same cryptosystem and the same key. We
note that, even in the case of a slight difference between two plain images, an efficient cryptosystem
should provide very different encrypted images. Additionally, the decryption differential analysis is
achieved by decrypting two images that differ in the value of a single encrypted pixel. The resulting
images should present a great dissemblance. The results of this analysis are provided in Table 4.
Table 4: Differential analysis
Encryption differential Decryption differential
analysis analysis
Average NPCR (%) 99.5824 99.6069
Average UACI (%) 33.5320 31.5697
Average PSNR (dB) 7.7489 8.4966
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The obtained results from the application of this analysis on the images of our test bank result in
NPCRs exceeding 99%, UACIs greater than 30%, and PSNRs well below 30dB. These mean values
reflect the efficiency of our proposed cryptosystem following this differential analysis. These good
performances derive from the chaotic aspect of the LUT generation and the involvement of the previous
original and encrypted pixels values during the encryption of a new pixel.
Next, we focus on the impact of the watermarking in our encryption/decryption method. We use
image watermarking to insert the subkey Key3 in the encrypted image. Before its embedding, Key3
should be ciphered using an 8-bit chaotic dynamic LUT parameterized by Key2. It is evident that
a false decryption of Key3 leads to a failure of the decryption of CiphGRP1 and CiphGRP2, and,
subsequently, the failure of the decryption of the encrypted image. This is well demonstrated earlier
in the key sensitivity study of the subkey Key3 (using the global key K3). In what follows, we assume
that a hacker knows Key1, Key2, and Key3 , but cannot locate the pixels embedding the watermark.
Thus, the hacker must either decrypt the pixels by a 7-bit chaotic dynamic LUT or by an 8-bit chaotic
dynamic LUT. In Figure 9, an example of this cryptanalysis attack is depicted as performed on the
encrypted image shown in Figure 4b.
(a) (b)
Figure 9: Decryption failure following the omission of the watermarking: (a) Decryption failure
following the omission of the watermarking and CRP4, (b) Decryption failure following the omission
of the watermarking and CRP3
Neglecting the used watermarking implies the omission of CRP3 or CRP4. Given the sensitivity
of our cryptosystem to its encryption/decryption keys (Tables 2-3) and its good performance against
differential analysis (table 4), it is expected that this cryptanalysis attempt results in a failed decryp-
tion as shown in Figure 9. In addition, correct decryption requires a correct extraction of the subkey
Key3 inserted in the encrypted image.
Suppose a hacker knows the structure of this subkey Key3, s/he must, at first, locate the carriers
of this mark inserted, which means the knowledge of the subkey Key1 placing the watermarked pixels
at the beginning of the image. Simulating the brute force attack with 1000 randomly selected keys
whose Key1 is placed at position 500, we compare the extracted signatures from this key bank to our
inserted signature. The obtained results (Figure 10a) reveal a correlation peak equal to 1 at position
500 (which corresponds to the position of Key1 in the test bank) accompanied by weak correlations
for the rest of the extracted signatures. These weak correlations (less than 0.2) highlight a failure to
locate the carriers of the marks and lead to the failure of the inserted signature extraction.
Furthermore, this extracted signature must be deciphered to recover the subkey Key3. This
requires knowledge of Key2. However, the cryptosystem CRP2 is very sensitive to any modification
of the key; hence, a wrong key causes a decryption failure (Table 2). A slight modification of the
cryptogram decrypted by the subkey Key2 will not recover Key3 (Table 2).
As a consequence, we have to try to decipher the false extracted signatures (false cryptograms) by
CRP2 using various keys similar to Key2. To do so, we choose to apply to each extracted signature
a decryption by 1000 different keys (of which the subkey Key2 is part). Then, we retain for each
extracted signature the decrypted signature that is closest to subkey Key3. The summary of this
brute force attack attempts is portrayed in Figure 10b. This figure shows a correlation peak equal to
1 at position 500, which means Key3 recovery. This peak corresponds to the decryption by the subkey
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Key2 of the encrypted subkey Key3. Conversely, the other decrypted signatures extracted reveal weak
correlations (less than 0.25) with Key3, meaning a failure to recover subkey Key3.
(a) (b)
Figure 10: Brute force attack cryptanalysis to recover the subkey Key3: (a) correlation of extracted
signatures and ciphered Key3 following brute force attack cryptanalysis applied on CRP1, (b) corre-
lation of decrypted extracted signatures and Key3 following Brute force attack cryptanalysis applied
on CRP1 and CRP2
To sum up, the failure of the watermarking extraction phase and/or an incorrect decryption of
the extracted signature prevent the subkey Key3 recovery, which obviously leads to a failure of the
deciphering phase of our proposed cryptosystem.
As a final test of robustness, we assess our cryptosystem against the known plaintext attack. In
this case, the hacker owns the original image (Figure 4a) and its ciphered counterpart (Figure 4b).
Moreover, we assume that s/he knows Key1 used in the sub cryptosystem CRP1. Thus, s/he can
extract a stream key compounded by all the LUT used in the encryption/decryption processes applied
to both of their images. Then, we verify this attack on the owned encrypted image (Figure 4c). Next,
we use this verified stream key to decipher another encrypted image issued from the same cryptosystem
parameterized by the key Key. The result of this cryptanalysis attempt is illustrated in Figure 11.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 11: Failed known plaintext attack: (a) Encrypted image to attack, (b) Failed attack, (c)
Decrypted image sought
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a new cryptosystem for image encryption based on a dynamic Look-Up
Table generated by the chaotic logistic map function. The proposed technique ensured a secure key
transmission operation by embedding a part of the secret key in the encrypted image. In fact, this
secret key was compounded by three subkeys, namely Key1, Key2, and Key3. Of these three, the first
one was computed from the recipient identifier while the second was derived from the sender identifier.
However, the third Key3 was randomly defined by the sender. This last subkey was inserted in the
encrypted image. Consequently, to decipher the received image, the recipient should first reorder
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pixels positions and then extract Key3 from the watermarked pixels. Before its use to decipher the
host image, Key3 should be decrypted using Key2. Thus, in addition to the sub-cryptosystem CRP1
which was used to cipher the image by reordering the pixels positions, our cryptosystem included three
others sub-cryptosystems, namely CRP2, CRP3, and CRP4. CRP2 and CRP4 were based on an 8-bit
dynamic LUT while CRP3 used a 7-bit dynamic LUT parameterized by Key3 to cipher watermarked
pixels. This same subkey was used by CRP4 to cipher non-watermarked pixels. On the other hand,
CRP2 set by Key2 was used to cipher Key3 before its insertion in the encrypted image. Each one of
these keys was encoded on 320 bits, which provided 2320 combinations of the embedded part of the
secret key for a single image exchange. This key space width reached 2960 combinations for a global
secret key formed by Key1, Key2, and Key3.
Experimental results provided by the assessment performed on our cryptosystem proved a high
sensitivity to any modification of the encryption/decryption key of the original and encrypted images.
Moreover, the encrypted image was clearly very different from the original image in terms of appearance
and histograms. In fact, the entropy of the encrypted image was very close to 8 bits due to its
uniform histogram aspect engendered by the randomness introduced during the encryption process.
Furthermore, the encrypted image revealed a low neighbors pixels correlation. Under the known
plaintext attack, our cryptosystem was proven robust. We noted also that watermarking strengthened
the efficiency of our proposed encryption scheme. As a matter of fact, its omission, a failure on the
extraction phase or a wrong decryption of the extracted mark would lead to a failure of the decryption
process.
This proposed watermarked cryptosystem could be exploited for medical records exchange between
distant hospitals to preserve any given patient’s medical condition by encrypting medical images and
inserting medical diagnoses on those encrypted images.
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